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LatCritical Perspectives: Individual Liberties,
State Security, and the War on Terrorism
BERTA E. HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL*
Glocalizing Terror
T he events of September 11, 2001, had a transformative effect
on life and society in the United States. On that day,
nineteen men, whose presence within U.S. territorial borders
ranged from the illegal to the mysterious, armed themselves with
box-cutters and hijacked four civilian aircraft-two American
Airlines and two United Airlines planes-and turned them into
human-controlled jet-fueled missiles of mass destruction by fly-
ing two into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New
York City and one into the Pentagon, outside of Washington,
D.C.' The perpetrators were not state actors; rather, they were
members of al Qaeda, a group that apparently worked with the
Taliban, a rebel group that was seeking to take control of Af-
ghanistan. Significantly, the Taliban was not recognized by the
global community except for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Pakistan, as the representative of that State.
These criminals, some of whom trained as pilots in U.S. flight
schools, were immediately and universally labeled as terrorists
for their heinous acts.
Thousands of innocent persons, including the passengers and
crews of the four aircraft, workers in the World Trade Center and
* Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of
Law. Many thanks to Matt Hawk, Vidal C6rdova, and Marco Kirby for excellent
research assistance. Special thanks to Cindy Zimmerman for extraordinary editing
and word processing work, and to Pat Hancock for terrific word processing support.
1 Although the hijacking of the fourth plane was successful, passengers thwarted
the hijackers' efforts and that plane crashed in Pennsylvania without taking casual-
ties beyond the persons aboard. Berta Esperanza HernAndez-Truyol & Christy
Gleason, Introduction, in MORAL IMPERIALIsM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 1 (Berta
Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol ed., 2002).
[941]
OREGON LAW REVIEW
the Pentagon, rescue workers, and bystanders, were killed or in-
jured. The deceased included citizens of the United States as
well as citizens of sixty other nations.2 Hundreds of millions of
dollars worth of property was damaged or destroyed. With these
occurrences, the United States, at present the sole surviving su-
perpower in the twenty-first century, was transmogrified from a
safe state to a besieged one-from a state where security and
even invulnerability was presumed to one permeated by fright,
incertitude, and anxiety.
Yet, while the popular narrative is that September 11 transfig-
ured life as we knew it in the United States, the reaction to those
events reflects historical patterns. For example, the domestic le-
gal response to these heinous acts has been, and continues to be,
to target immigrants based on their national, racial, religious,
ethnic, and even political identities-specifically Muslim men of
Middle Eastern descent. This targeting is much like that of the
U.S. Alien and Sedition Acts which, respectively, gave the Presi-
dent the power to deport non-citizens deemed a threat to na-
tional security without recourse to the courts or rights of habeas
corpus and made it a crime to criticize government officials.'
Similarly, the Alien Enemies Act,4 which authorizes the Presi-
dent during a declared war to detain, expel, and impose other
restrictions on the freedom of any citizen (fourteen years or
older) of the country with which the United States is at war,
paved the way for the internment of persons of Japanese descent,
including U.S. citizens, during the Second World War.5 Anti-im-
migrant sentiments also surfaced during the "Red Scare" which
led Congress to pass immigration laws prohibiting entry into the
United States to persons who advocated "the overthrow by force
or violence of the government of the United States or of all gov-
2 Id.
3 The Alien Act (July 6, 1798), reprinted in An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/alien.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003);
The Sedition Act-An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled An Act for the Punish-
ment of Certain Crimes Against the United States (July 14, 1798), at http://www.yale.
edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/sedact.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
4 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1994).
5 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally David Cole, En-
emy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liber-
ties, and the Lessons of History, Social Science Research Network, UNC Public Law
Research Paper No. 02-23, at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=354761 (date posted Dec.
6, 2002).
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ernment or all forms of law."6 During this time, it was not much
of a leap from targeting immigrants for exclusion based on their
political beliefs to targeting citizens during the McCarthy Era
when federal, state, and local governments passed laws against
communists and the House Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties compiled dossiers on thousands of U.S. citizens.7 Today, we
see these anti-immigrant and anti-dissident patterns repeated in
the responses to September 11. For example, like the Enemy
Alien Act, the PATRIOT Act 8-the centerpiece of post-9/11
federal antiterrorism legislation-does not require a proceeding
to decide whether an individual is suspicious, disloyal, or
dangerous.
The United States, promptly joined by the global community,
labeled the events of September 11 as an act of war. Such desig-
nation elides al Qaeda's criminal acts with (possibly legally justi-
fiable) acts of war-an identification that may carry legally
problematic consequences. To explore these perhaps unintended
outcomes, Part I of this Essay sets out the September 11 timeline
and Part II comments on the four essays that constitute this clus-
ter in light of those facts. Part III engages the legal issues-both
domestic and international-of U.S. (and global) reactions to the
attacks. In Part IV, this work concludes that the domestic and
international norms that existed at the time of the September 11
assaults were sufficient to identify and punish the heinous con-
duct and that there was no need to pass laws that sacrificed per-
sonal liberties in order to protect the national security.
I
THE FACTS9
On September 11, 2001, at 7:59 a.m., American Airlines Flight
11 left Boston's Logan International Airport en route to Los An-
geles, carrying ninety-two people. At 8:45 a.m., this flight, with
6 Immigration Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214, repealed by
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 38, 39 Stat. 874, 897. See also Cole,
supra note 5, at 994-96.
7 Cole, supra note 5, at 996; Muller, supra note 5.
8 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
9 These facts are taken from numerous accounts about September 11, mainly
those available at http://www.cnn.com; http://www.crimesofwar.org/sept-mag/sept-
home.html; and http://www.pbs.org.
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five hijackers on board, crashed into One World Trade Center,
the north tower of New York's World Trade Center."° Eighteen
minutes later, United Airlines Flight 93, which at 8:01 a.m. had
left New Jersey's Newark International Airport en route to San
Francisco carrying forty-five people, crashed into Two World
Trade Center." Around that time, police and firefighters re-
sponded to the emergency at the towers.
At 9:43 a.m., almost one hour after the first crash, American
Airlines Flight 77, with five hijackers on board,12 crashed into the
Pentagon. At that time, trading on Wall Street stopped. Fifteen
minutes later, a passenger aboard United Airlines Flight 175,
which had left Boston en route to Los Angeles carrying sixty-five
people, placed a call to an emergency dispatcher in Pennsylvania
saying, "We are being hijacked, we are being hijacked!" At 10:10
a.m., this flight, with five hijackers on board,'3 crashed eighty
miles southeast of Pittsburgh with its assumed target somewhere
in Washington, D.C. At that time, President Bush was en route
to Louisiana and put America's military on high alert status.
President George W. Bush's first remarks to the nation called
the crashes an "apparent terrorist attack on our country. ' 14 He
later called the attacks an act of war.
Shortly after the crash into the Pentagon, the Federal Aviation
Administration barred aircraft takeoffs across the United States
and instructed international flights in progress to land in Canada.
Reagan Airport in Washington, D.C., did not reopen until Octo-
ber 4.
By midmorning, government buildings across the nation were
evacuated, the United Nations closed, and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission closed all U.S. financial markets for the day.
New York's Mayor Rudolph Giuliani evacuated lower Manhat-
tan. By that afternoon, the U.S. military was on high alert world-
10 The five hijackers were Abdulaziz Alomari, Satam al Suqami, Waleed M. Al-
shehri, Wail Alshehri, and Mohammed Atta, the mastermind of the attacks who was
thought to have piloted the plane. This tower collapsed at 10:28 a.m.
11 There were four hijackers onboard this flight: Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Al
Haznawi, Ahmed Alnami, and Ziad Jarrahi. This tower collapsed at 9:55 a.m.
12 The five hijackers were Khalid al-Midhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf Alhamzi, Sa-
lem Alhamzi, and Hani Hanjuor. This plane was carrying sixty-four people from
Washington Dulles to Los Angeles.
13 The five hijackers were Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Ahmed Al-
ghamdi, Hamza Alghamdi, and Mohand Alshehri.
14 Terrorism Hits the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at 52.
[Vol. 81, 20021
Glocalizing Terror
wide and the Navy had dispatched missile destroyers and other
equipment to New York and Washington.
During the evening of September 11, Four, Five, Six and Seven
World Trade Center and the Pedestrian Bridge collapsed. An es-
timated 6333 people were missing and, eventually, almost 3000
were declared dead, including approximately 300 firefighters, 40
police officers, and foreign citizens from 65 countries.
Global response to the attacks was fast. For example, on Sep-
tember 12, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in-
voked Article 5 of its founding treaty, a mutual defense clause
stating that an armed attack against any of the allied nations in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
all of them. 15 The day after the attack, many governments of the
world, including President Vladimir Putin of Russia, German
Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der, French President Jacques Chirac,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi, and the European Union's Security Chief Javier So-
lana, expressed both solidarity with the United States and sup-
port against terrorism.
Given such positive response, the Bush administration began
an effort to form a coalition against terrorism. This endeavor re-
ceived overwhelming support including some from such surpris-
ing sources as Pakistan's ruler General Pervez Musharraf, Saudi
Arabia's King Fahd, North Korea, Egypt's President Hosni
Mubarak, and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan.
15 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,
246 (1949). While the political consensus is important, the NATO alliance has little
to offer the U.S. militarily. Specifically, Article 5 provides as follows:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recog-
nized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic
area.
Id. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was subsequently
revised. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Tur-
key, Oct. 22, 1951, art. 2, at http://www.hri.org/docs/NATO/grturk.html (Aug. 17,
1996).
"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immedi-
ately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain inter-
national peace and security." North Atlantic Treaty, supra, at art. 5.
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Moreover, the States that had recognized the Taliban as Afghani-
stan's government quickly severed their ties, ending recognition.
China, at first, offered mixed support. It pledged to join the
United States in a global war against terrorism, but was re-
strained by its opposition to intervention in the affairs of other
nations and the ties it has with countries the United States has
named as "state sponsors of terrorism." But by the end of Sep-
tember, the Chinese government expressed strong support for
the U.S. war on terrorism and even for limited military strikes.
The fruits of international cooperation were evident by this time,
when arrests of those with suspected terrorist links were made in
nations including the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, the United
Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates.
However, cooperation did not come without a price. Many
Middle-Eastern countries wanted the United States to become
more deeply involved in ending violence in the region. Pakistan
wanted an agreement to end an eleven-year sanction, restore the
flow of American arms, and reduce a punishing debt load in ex-
change for use of its bases or rights to fly in its air space. Russia
had grievances over NATO expansion towards its borders and
criticism of its military campaign in Chechnya. The United
States, in order to obtain its support, agreed to ignore Russia's
massive human rights violations in Chechnya, including its armed
incursions into territory that sought to be independent.
On September 14, Congress, by joint resolution, authorized
the President to:
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons. 16
President Bush created the Office of Homeland Security, now
elevated to a Cabinet-level office,1 7 and named Gov. Tom Ridge
of Pennsylvania as its head. On September 18, the Bush adminis-
tration advised a joint session of Congress that al Qaeda was re-
sponsible for the attacks. The administration also announced a
16 Sense of Congress Regarding Terrorist Attacks, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001). S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (enacted).
17 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101).
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major expansion of its power to detain immigrants who are sus-
pected of crimes which was followed, two days later, by the issu-
ance by the Department of Justice of an interim rule providing
that non-citizens can be detained for forty-eight hours without
charge and, in "emergenc[ies] or other extraordinary circum-
stance[s] ... [for] an additional reasonable period of time."18
Three days later, the Chief Immigration Judge sent a memo to
immigration judges to let them know that deportation hearings
for persons suspected of terrorism should be secret and not
public.' 9
On September 24, in an effort to stop the source of funding to
terrorist cells, President Bush ordered an immediate freeze of all
assets of twenty-seven suspected terrorist entities (thirteen ter-
rorist groups, eleven individuals, and three charities) 20 with iden-
tified links to al Qaeda-a list that was later expanded to include
two dozen more charities and other organizations, including
charities in Saudi Arabia and Chicago and an Arab bank. Presi-
dent Bush went beyond the U.S. borders and declared that for-
eign banks that did not cooperate with U.S. investigators would
be unable to operate in the United States.
On October 1, the Bush administration released the names of
nineteen countries that had agreed to freeze the assets of Osama
18 Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334,
48,335 (Sept. 20, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d)).
19 Cesar Mufioz Acebes, United States: Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights
Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees, HUMAN RTS. WATCH, Aug. 2002, at 24
(2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/repprts/2002/US911 (quoting Michael
Creppy, Cases Requiring Special Procedure, Internal Memorandum-Executive Office
for Immigration Review, Sept. 21, 2001 (directive by Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy requiring closure of all special interest cases, meaning those that the
Attorney General determines might be connected to the September 11 events)).
This document is known as the "Creppy Directive."
20 Following September 11, President Bush issued an executive order in which he
declared a national emergency and authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
freeze assets of entities that "assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material or tech-
nological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of
terrorism." Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001), at http://
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2003). The Seventh Circuit has now found that the government acted within legal
bounds in freezing the assets of Global Relief Foundation, Inc. (GRF)-a U.S. char-
ity which is an Illinois corporation-that is being investigated for terrorist links al-
though the court did not inquire into whether the charity in fact had links to
terrorism. Specifically, in affirming the District Court's denial of GRF's request for
an injunction, the court concluded that the freezing of assets violated neither the
Constitution nor the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Global Relief
Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002).
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bin Laden and his associates. For example, Germany froze ac-
counts linked to the Taliban or bin Laden and Britain froze $68
million in accounts of entities on the original list of twenty-
seven. 21 At that time, other countries cooperating in the finan-
cial freezings included China, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the
Czech Republic. However, bin Laden's money was thought to be
scattered in as many as fifty-five countries. U.S. officials later
said that sixty-six other nations had frozen accounts on the sus-
pect list and 110 others had pledged to move in that direction.22
In October, the coalition against terrorism continued to grow
with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tijikistan, three of the
world's worst violators of human rights, becoming U.S. allies
against Afghanistan. Throughout the effort to form a coalition
against terrorism, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was at the
forefront of foreign relations declaring that he had seen "incon-
trovertible evidence" linking bin Laden to the terrorist attacks
and promising that military actions would be against bin Laden
and perhaps the Taliban, but not Afghans or the Islamic faith.23
On October 7, the war against terrorism took a significant turn
when U.S. military forces launched Operation Enduring Free-
dom against Kabul, Afghanistan, consisting of U.S.-led air strikes
in which the British also participated, which targeted forces asso-
ciated with both al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership under Mul-
lah Muhammad Omar. The next day, the United States informed
the U.N. Security Council that inquiry into the terrorist attacks
could lead beyond Afghanistan and later elaborated that U.S. of-
ficials believed terrorists tied to Osama bin Laden were based in
the Asian countries of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia,
and those countries were likely targets of future covert and overt
U.S. actions.
On the second day of the attacks, the Philippine government
gave the United States full support for its air strikes on Afghani-
stan, granting U.S. fighter jets and warships full access to all ports
in the Philippines and allowing U.S. troops and weapons to re-
21 See William Drozdiak & T.R. Reid, Money Laundering Targeted in Europe,
Mideast; Steps Likely to Exceed Bush's Call for Freeze, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2001, at
A12.
22 Disrupting Terrorist Financing Globally, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 12, 2001.
23 Alan Cowell, A Nation Challenged: The British; Blair Says He's Seen Proof of
bin Laden's Role, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at B4.
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main in the Philippines for as long as needed.24 Also on the sec-
ond day of the attacks, Spain, Italy, Germany, and France
pledged to send troops if necessary, and NATO agreed to send
five AWACS (Airborn Warning and Control System) early warn-
ing planes and crews to the United States to free up American
surveillance aircraft for use in the campaign. The fifteen foreign
ministers of the European Union again declared their support, as
did leaders in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Later, China
pledged support in the war against terrorism and Asian leaders at
the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit
signed a statement against terrorism. After the attacks began,
Iran and Iraq issued statements condemning the U.S. and British
military strikes in Afghanistan.
Other domestic and international measures taken in response
to the terrorist attacks are noteworthy. On October 26, Presi-
dent Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act,25 legislation
that grants the Attorney General unprecedented powers, includ-
ing the ability to detain non-citizens "if the Attorney General has
reasonable grounds to believe" they are "engaged in any ... ac-
tivity that endangers the national security of the United States 26
and to deport or refuse entry to persons who "endorse or es-
pouse terrorist activity," who persuade others to support terrorist
activity or a terrorist organization, or raise money for a terrorist
group.27 Several days later, the Department of Justice issued an
interim rule allowing prison authorities to monitor communica-
tions between inmates and their counsel in instances in which the
Attorney General certifies that there is "reasonable suspicion"
that the inmate is using such communications to facilitate acts of
violence or terrorism. 28 Domestically, airport security was tight-
ened and municipalities were put on highest alert. In late Octo-
ber, the United States released a "most wanted" list of twenty-
two suspected terrorists, including Osama bin Laden and some of
his top allies, whom President Bush called "the leaders, key sup-
porters, planners and strategists. 29
24 Most of Asia Backs U.S. Actions, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Oct. 9,
2001, at 4.
25 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 8.
26 Id. § 236A(a)(3)(B) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).
27 Id. § 411(a)(1)(A)(iii) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)).
28 National Security: Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
55.062 (Oct. 31, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 500 & 501 (2001)).
29 Eric Lichtblau & Josh Meyer, U.S. Strikes Back; The Investigation; U.S. Unveils
'Most Wanted' Terrorist List, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at A12.
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In November, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced
that in order to identify potential terrorists, the United States
would require non-citizen young men from Arab and Muslim na-
tions to register with the government.30  The process requires
men over the age of sixteen from twenty-two nations to be inter-
viewed, photographed, and fingerprinted.31 Their information is
checked against databases maintained by the FBI and other U.S.
government entities.3" The program is not applicable to perma-
nent residents, those who obtained asylum before November 6,
2002, or diplomats and their families.
On November 13, President Bush issued a military order on
the trial of terrorists by military commission3 3 which has been
interpreted effectively to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The
same day President Bush issued the military order, the Taliban
withdrew from Kabul and Afghan opposition fighters took over
the city. The following day, the U.N. Security Council unani-
mously adopted Resolution 1378 and "[a]ffirm[ed] that the
United Nations should play a central role in supporting the ef-
forts of the Afghan people to establish urgently such a new and
transitional administration leading to the formation of a new
government. ' 34
Numerous cases related to the attacks are now pending. On
30 67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002). The countries included Afghanistan, Alge-
ria, Armenia, Bahrain, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
31 Id. at 67,766-67.
32 See John M. Broder & Susan Sachs, Threats and Responses: The Tightening
Border: Facing Registry Deadline, Men From Muslim Nations Swamp Immigration
Office, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/17/
politics/17IMMI.html.
33 Military Order of November 13, 2001-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831 (Nov. 16, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html.
The only precedent on this matter is Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and Exparte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). In Milligan, the Court did not allow a civilian,
unconnected with the rebellion in the southern states, to be tried by a military com-
mission so long as the civilian courts were open and martial law had not been de-
clared. In contrast, Quirin upheld trial by military commission of German soldiers
who had landed in the United States, discarded their uniforms, and sought to sabo-
tage war facilities. They were charged with violating the laws of war.
34 Sec. C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/scres.htm. The resolution expresses support for the Secretary-General's
special representative in Afghanistan; Lakhdar Brahimi, in the accomplishment of
his mandate which included overall authority for the humanitarian, human rights,
and political endeavors of the United Nations in Afghanistan.
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December 11, 2001, the Justice Department announced the in-
dictment of Zacarias Moussaoui-the suspected twentieth hi-
jacker-charging him with conspiring with Osama bin Laden and
al Qaeda to commit acts of terrorism "transcending national
boundaries" among other offenses, including the commission of
the terrorist acts that were perpetrated on September 11. 35
On January 15, 2002, the Justice Department announced the
filing of criminal charges against John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citi-
zen who was taken prisoner while fighting with the Taliban
forces. Lindh, called the "American Taliban," was charged with
conspiracy to kill members of the U.S. military in Afghanistan
and with providing material supportive resources to foreign ter-
rorist organizations, including al Qaeda. He pleaded guilty to
supplying services to the Taliban and to a criminal charge of car-
rying an explosive during the commission of a felony. On Octo-
ber 4, 2002, he was sentenced to twenty years in prison. 36
In June, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that an-
other U.S. citizen was in custody for being involved in planning
terrorist attacks. Jose Padilla, now known as Abdulla Al-
Muhajir, was arrested in Chicago for having a "dirty bomb" that
he planned to explode in the United States. Ashcroft announced
that Al-Muhajir would be transferred to military authorities to
be held as an enemy combatant. On December 4, 2002, Judge
Mukasey of the Southern District of New York denied the gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss a habeas petition filed by Al-
Muhajir's counsel. The District Court ruled that it has jurisdic-
tion to hear the case and that the prisoner could consult with
counsel while pursuing habeas relief. The court also noted that
the President could lawfully order the prisoner's detention as an
enemy combatant even if the prisoner holds U.S. citizenship and
that the standard for lawful detention in this case would be the
existence of "some evidence" to justify such detention.37
On January 11, 2002, the United States transferred the first
group of captives from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base in
Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. Pictures of the transferred Taliban-al
Qaeda captives in shackles, either hooded or wearing black-out
35 United States v. Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01-455-A, 2002 WL 1987964 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 23, 2002).
36 United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also United
States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
37 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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goggles, and prison jumpsuits, and sometimes brought to their
knees, generated protests from around the world and from within
the United States as well. One source of contention was the
treatment of the captives. Another source of contention was
President Bush's announcement on the status of the prisoners
who include over 150 citizens of over twenty states including
three from Great Britain and one from Australia.38 President
Bush, ignoring established procedure, unilaterally declared that
the Third Geneva Convention would apply to the Taliban but not
to the al Qaeda detainees. Moreover, the President declared that
neither group would be granted prisoner of war status, designat-
ing the captives instead as "unlawful combatants"-a classifica-
tion unknown in the international humanitarian law field.3 9 The
United States ignored the global demands for the captives to be
treated according to accepted international norms, but said that
it would treat the captives humanely.
In March, 2002, the Department of Defense announced the
guidelines for the military commissions created to try suspected
terrorists. Following this announcement, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, tracking the guidelines, asserted that the
United States was entitled to hold the detainees without trial,
even after acquittal-until the end of the war against terrorism,
as is a standard with enemy combatants captured during the
course of a war.
Not surprisingly, numerous challenges to U.S. practices and
policies with respect to the captives have been lodged. In Au-
gust, Judge Gladys Kessler of the District of Columbia ordered
the U.S. government to release the names of all the people de-
tained in the United States during the anti-terrorism investiga-
tion, saying that it is the judiciary's duty "to ensure that our
Government always operates within the statutory and constitu-
tional constraints which distinguish a democracy from a dictator-
ship."4 Later that month, Judge Robert G. Doumar of Virginia
38 Eric Lichtblau, Attorneys for British and Australian Citizens Held at Camp X-
Ray Say International Laws are Being Violated, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at A12.
39 The prisoner of war status would require certain treatment under the Geneva
Conventions and would also impede trial in the military tribunals set up by President
Bush. See infra notes 139, 151-53, and accompanying text. One obstacle to
designating these captives "prisoners of war" is that such status requires the captive
to have been acting on behalf of a state, whereas the captives, as well as the actors in
the September 11 attacks, were acting on behalf of the Taliban or al Qaeda, neither
of which is a recognized state.
40 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96
[Vol. 81, 2002]
Glocalizing Terror
ordered the U.S. government to provide evidence in support of
the designation of U.S.-born Yaser Hamdi, who had been picked
up by United States forces in Afghanistan and is being held in a
navy brig in Virginia, as an unlawful enemy combatant.4' The
circuit court reversed that order, however, ruling that the decla-
ration by a special advisor setting forth the circumstances of
Hamdi's capture was alone sufficient to justify his detention, not-
ing that his U.S. citizenship did not preclude his detention as an
enemy combatant captured "during a combat operation under-
taken in a foreign country and a determination by the executive
that [he] was allied with enemy forces."4 2 Also in August, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the deportation hear-
ings for people detained during the anti-terrorism investigation
had to be open to the public.43 However, in October, the Third
Circuit held that newspapers do not have a right of access to
cases designated as "special interest" cases by the Attorney Gen-
eral due to national security concerns."
One case in U.S. courts that is noteworthy particularly in light
of the Ali Abbasi case discussed below is Rasul v. Bush."5 This
case involved a challenge by two British, one Australian, and
twelve Kuwaiti nationals who were captured in Afghanistan to
their Guantdnamo detention.46 The court dismissed the detain-
ees' petition for habeas corpus, ruling that foreigners held by the
(D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that Department had to disclose names of detainees under
Freedom of Information Act; Department did not have to disclose date and location
of arrest, detention and release; Department could not withhold the identity of
counsel representing detainees; Department did not properly respond to request re-
garding detainees or immigration proceedings).
41 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 2:02cv439 (E.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2002) (order filed re-
questing government to produce more information), available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums8l602ord.pdf.
42 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (reversing and remanding district court order
mandating government to allow counsel unmonitored access to detainee because
order failed to give proper deference to Executive and Congressional decisions con-
cerning foreign policy, national security or military affairs and because the order
failed to address status as enemy combatant); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th
Cir. 2002) (reversing district court ruling that public defender and private citizen had
standing to file next of friend habeas petition on behalf of detainee with status of
enemy combatant).
43 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (ruling that there is
a First Amendment right of access to deportation cases and the directive requiring
secret hearings infringes on that right).
44 N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
45 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
46 The action by the twelve Kuwaiti detainees and their family members, Odah v.
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United States outside of its sovereign territory could not seek
habeas relief in U.S. courts.47
Two foreign cases are worthy of mention. In Germany, prose-
cutors charged Moroccan-born Mounir El-Motassedeq with sup-
porting the work of the al Qaeda cell in Hamburg that planned
the September 11 attacks.48 Prosecutors claim that El-Motas-
sedeq managed the bank account of some of the al Qaeda mem-
bers taking flight school lessons in the United States.
In Britain, the family of a British national, Feroz Ali Abbasi,
who was captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and was trans-
ported to Guantdinamo Bay, initiated proceedings based on the
claim that one of his fundamental human rights, the right not to
be arbitrarily detained, is being violated.49 At the time of hear-
ing in the' England and Wales Court of Appeal, Abbasi had been
a captive in Guantinamo "for eight months without access to a
court or any other form of tribunal or even a lawyer."5 The En-
glish court, while refusing to examine whether a foreign state, in
this instance the United States, was in breach of treaty obliga-
tions or in breach of public international law, concluded that "in
apparent contravention of fundamental principles recognized by
both jurisdictions and by international law, Mr. Abbasi is at pre-
sent arbitrarily detained in a 'legal black-hole'"I
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, an organ of the Organization of American
States of which the United States is a member, by letter dated
March 12, 2002, requested that the United States "take the ur-
gent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees
at Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent Tribunal. '5 2
The United States responded by claiming that "the legal status of
the detainees is clear, that the Commission does not have juris-
dictional competence to apply international humanitarian law,
that the precautionary measures are neither necessary nor appro-
priate in this case, and that the Commission lacks authority to
United States, No. A. 02-828 (D.D.C. 2002), was brought separately but is decided
together with Rasul. 215 F. Supp. 2d 55.
47 Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73.
48 Susan Schmidt & Dan Eggen, Suspected Planner of 9/11 Attacks Captured in
Pakistan After Gunfight; Two Other Al Qaeda Members Killed, Several More Ar-
rested, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2002, at Al.
49 Rv. Sec. of State, [2002] EWCA Civ 1598.
50 d. 1.
51 Id. 64.
52 Id. 21 (quoting Commission letter).
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request precautionary measures of the United States."53 In re-
ply, the Commission reasserted its authority to request precau-
tionary measures citing to Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention and Article XVIII of the American Declaration.
The Commission claimed the right of
human rights supervisory bodies such as this Commission [to]
raise doubts concerning the status of persons detained in the
course of an armed conflict, as it has in the present matter, and
require that such [a] status be clarified to the extent that such
clarification is essential to determine whether their human
rights are being respected. In light of the principle of efficacy,
it is not sufficient for a detaining power to simply assert its
view as to the status of a detainee to the exclusion of any
proper or effectual procedure for verifying that status.54
This overview of the events of September 11 and the series of
domestic and international responses thereto-legal, military,
and political-intertwine the global and the local, effectively glo-
calizing terror. Foreign forces united to effect a military strike
against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Captives from
numerous countries are held by the U.S. military on a base in
Cuba. Assets have been frozen in financial institutions around
the world. The global and local lines are blurred or trespassed,
depending on one's point of view, by collective enforcement
against terror as well as by unilateral actions that, while seeking
to bring justice against terrorism within one state's borders,
threaten the (international) human and (domestic) civil rights
and liberties of citizens and non-citizens alike, both at home and
abroad.
II
NATIONAL SECURITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES-THE ESSAYS
This section's four authors grapple with the tensions caused by
the September 11 events, particularly with respect to the oppos-
ing demands, on the one hand, to protect the nation's and its
peoples' national security interests in the fight against terrorism
and, on the other hand, to protect the individual rights and liber-
ties of those apprehended and detained as suspects who may
have committed or supported the commission of terrorist acts.
53 Id. (quoting U.S. letter of April 11, 2002).
54 Id. (quoting Commission letter of July 23, 2002).
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Raquel Aldana-Pindell, in her piece entitled The 9/11 "Na-
tional Security Cases": Three Principles Guiding Judges' Decision
Making, focuses on the "three factual or legal distinctions that
have (or should have) guided the outcome in the post-September
11 litigation."55 Her first assertion is that, historically, "the scope
of judicial deference to the executive has depended on whether
the courts have considered the president's actions to implicate
greater concerns with national security than domestic affairs."56
This national security/domestic concerns dichotomy that she sets
up is grounded in the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 57 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.58 Aldana-Pindell posits that "[t]his precedent
holds that the president's national security inherent powers are
greater the more his actions affect national security affairs (Cur-
tiss-Wright) and less the more his actions affect domestic affairs
(Youngstown)."59 Significantly, however, she realistically recog-
nizes that it is increasingly difficult to designate any action in the
September 11 events as purely domestic or purely national secur-
ity and that this creates difficulty for the courts in ascertaining
which precedent governs and results in the "mixed" judicial re-
sponse to the executive actions.60 The split in the circuits con-
cerning the legal validity of the Creppy Directive authorizing
secret immigration hearings confirms this difficulty.
The second principle that Aldana-Pindell proposes is that:
[C]ourts have not deferred to the executive, even in cases that
implicate national security, when the president is exercising a
power the Constitution clearly reserves for Congress. In the
post-September 11 litigation, this issue has arisen in the presi-
dent's decision to bar those detained as "enemy combatants"
from pursuing habeas petitions and to prescribe federal courtjurisdiction over the military tribunals. 61
Although the courts have not directly addressed whether the
president has congressional approval to deny judicial review, the
author argues that "the president has acted unilaterally to do so
and, therefore, that courts have incorrectly ignored significant
55 Raquel Aldana-Pindell, The 9-11 'National Security' Cases: Three Principles
Guiding Judges' Decision Making, 81 OR. L. REV. 985 (2003).
56 Id.
57 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
58 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
59 Aldana-Pindell, supra note 55, at 996.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 997.
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separation of powers concerns. '62 Lastly, the author notes that
in some post-September 11 cases the judiciary has respected the
claimants' Bill of Rights concerns, although courts in the past
have ignored some concerns over such individual liberties. How-
ever, she reconciles these ostensible tensions by noting that, one,
courts often distinguish between substantive and procedural indi-
vidual rights in deferring to the political branches in national se-
curity matters and, two, that courts have sometimes limited the
president's discretion in keeping national security secrets to guar-
antee the public's ability to hold the government accountable to
the rule of law.63
Aldana-Pindell discusses the numerous cases pending in courts
and ultimately suggests that the national security/domestic di-
chotomy explains the different approaches courts have taken to
detainees abroad-at Camp Xray in Guantdinamo Bay-as con-
trasted to those who are held within the United States. She sug-
gests that the inherent national security powers allow the
executive to detain "enemy combatants" and thus courts will
tend to defer to the executive on these matters. Yet, the constitu-
tional question of whether the enemy combatants, even if prop-
erly detained, may be denied the right to judicial review,
including habeas petitions, has been answered as to allow United
States unilateral actions. The author, however, challenges this
outcome on grounds of separation of powers as well as on inter-
national law.
Natsu Taylor Saito's piece, Whose Liberty? Whose Security?
The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and
the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent in the United
States,64 also challenges the national security versus individual
liberties dichotomy that Aldana-Pindell suggests. In this work,
however, Saito sets out the history of the U.S. government acting
not only against non-citizens but also against U.S. citizens when
they participate in unpopular causes. She describes the targeted
populations as ranging from war resisters to labor activists, from
indigenous people to non-citizens, from civil rights activists to
other subversives. Specifically, she focuses on the activities of
COINTELPRO, which employs tactics of surveillance and infil-
62 Id.
63 Id. at 999.
64 Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act
in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent
in the United States, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 (2003).
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tration, dissemination of false information, creation of intra- and
inter-group conflict, abuse of the criminal justice system, and col-
laboration in assaults and assassinations to discredit unpopular
peoples and causes. Significantly, she details the specific target-
ing of communist and socialist organizations, the civil right move-
ment, the Klan and other white hate groups, the new left and the
anti-war movement, black national organizations and the Black
Panther Party, and the American Indian movement to show the
breadth of the government's activities over what it deems unpop-
ular causes.
Saito then analyzes more recent anti-terrorist legislation and
governmental policy as well as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
to suggest that these initiatives simply reflect the continuation of
these historically undesirable governmental intrusions into peo-
ple's lives. Specifically, she points to the enhanced surveillance
powers, the criminalization of protest, the enhanced restrictions
on immigrants, and enhanced funding and interagency communi-
cation to show that individual liberties and rights are being sacri-
ficed in the war against terrorism without any concomitant
assurances for greater security.
In conclusion, she interrogates "how much 'liberty' are we will-
ing to sacrifice for the sake of 'security'?"65 She suggests that her
historical review urges a more skeptical and critical analysis
about the government's intentions in its denial of liberties with
the goal of increasing national security. She exhorts that "the
federal government has consistently used its powers, legally and
illegally, to suppress social and political movements which it sees
as threatening the status quo. It is in this context that we must
examine the expanded powers currently being exercised by the
executive branch and legitimized by Congress."66
She adds, much like Aldana-Pindell suggests, that "the current
expansion of executive powers and the concomitant restrictions
on civil rights are not simply a response to a national emergency
sparked by recent acts of terrorism, but a move toward legitimat-
ing powers that have a long history of being used consciously and
deliberately to suppress political dissent."67
Recognizing that the United States is the sole global super-
power-political, economic, and military-she urges that such
65 Id. at 1128.
66 Id.
67 Id.
[Vol. 81, 20021
Glocalizing Terror 959
status carries with it a responsibility to ensure that all people re-
alize fundamental human rights-rights that she implies are be-
ing denied by the initiatives enacted pursuant to the existing war
against terrorism:, She concludes as follows:
To the extent that governmental practices violate the Constitu-
tion and basic principles of international law, the fact that they
are being "legalized" by Congress cannot give us comfort.
Again, this was one of the basic principles articulated by no
less than Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson at the Nurem-
berg Tribunals-the existence of national laws legitimizing
particular practices does not render those practices lawful in
the larger sense of the term.68
The other two papers focus more on the consequences of the
war against terrorism for local communities. Peggy Nagae, in
Justice and Equity for Whom? A Personal Journey and Local Per-
spective on Community Justice and Struggles for Dignity ,69 re-
counts the evolution of her understanding of Korematsu v. United
States" to admonish against the current trends. In Korematsu,
the Supreme Court, while finding that distinctions between citi-
zens solely because of their ancestry or by their nature are odious
to a free people, nevertheless concluded that military necessity
rendered both the exclusion of Japanese and the internment of
Japanese Americans constitutionally permissible.7' This case
both challenged her sense of justice and sparked a desire to pur-
sue justice and equity for all. As a Japanese American, she de-
cided to attend law school and dedicate her life to such pursuits,
joining civil rights organizations that focus on the protection of
civil rights and liberties as well as being an advocate. Specifi-
cally, she represented one of the claimants in the reopening of
the cases of Japanese American incarceration and was successful
in having her client's conviction erased.
Her concerns with the post-September 11 events are grounded
in this personal history. She sees that, like with the Korematsu
"military necessity internment," today national security is being
used as a basis to target persons on the basis of race.
Today the term "military necessity" has given way to "national
68 Id. at 1130.
69 Peggy Nagae, Justice and Equity for Whom? A Personal Journey and Local
Perspective on Community Justice and Struggles for Dignity, 81 OR. L. REV. __
(2003).
70 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
71 Nagae, supra note 69, at 1135.
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security," but the impact is the same; just as it was four de-
cades ago, race is still used as an indicator of loyalty (now
called patriotism) and is still justified because of stereotypes
and prejudices that lead to discrimination. As happened with
Japanese Americans in World War II, the current government
has arrested and detained more than a thousand "suspected"
terrorists and has imprisoned U.S. citizens indefinitely without
bail, criminal charges, or access to attorneys. In addition, the
government has proposed the creation of detention camps for
U.S. citizens deemed "enemy combatants," without judicial re-
view. The government believes that, in the name of safety,
racial profiling is justified now as it was then.72
The author condemns these actions noting that now, like in Kore-
matsu's experience, "in times of war, distress, and military neces-
sity . . . we need to be the most vigilant about protecting rights
and abhorring racial profiling."73
Like Nagae's work, Steven Bender's Sight, Sound, and Stereo-
type: The War on Terrorism and Its Consequences for Latinas!
os 7 looks at the post-September 11 consequences of "hate
crimes, discrimination, and profiling directed at Arab Americans,
Arabs, and Muslims in the United States. ' 75 He then links this
anti-Arab/Muslim backlash to the discriminations that Latinas/os
and other subordinated groups suffer within the United States.
Like Saito, Bender engages in a historical analysis. His analysis,
however, concerns the position of Latinas/os within U.S. society
and culture and notes that they, like Arab immigrants are now,
have been the subject of negative sentiments.
Given [the] societal construction [of Latinas/os] as violent, for-
eign, criminal-minded, disloyal, and as overrunning the bor-
der, there are numerous grounds by which Americans might
similarly construct Latinas/os as a terrorist threat. Because
undocumented immigrants are now seen as a national security
threat, as would-be terrorists, the longstanding association of
Latinas/os with "illegal aliens" may cause Americans to view
Latinas/os with suspicion.76
Significantly, Bender notes that the leap to such a terrorist label-
ing is not a huge one in light of "the societal association of La-
tinas/os with drugs [which] could shape a conception of Latinas/
72 Id. at 1136.
73 Id. at 1150 (citing Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's opinion vacating Korematsu's
conviction, Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406, 1416 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
74 Steven Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and Its
Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153 (2003).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1154 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 81, 2002]
Glocalizing Terror
os as 'narco-terrorists'."77 Furthermore, he analogizes the cur-
rent war on terrorism to President Richard Nixon's war on drugs
which resulted in the deployment of some agents at the Mexican
border as part of the initiative to curtail drug smuggling, a posi-
tion that President Reagan followed by issuing a security direc-
tive that classified drugs as a national security threat.78 Bender
proceeds to provide examples of instances in the Latinas/os his-
tory in the United States that could support the linkage of terror-
ism with the Latina/o identity, including the Mexican and Puerto
Rican struggles for independence and self-determination:
In the wake of September 11, Latinas/os were also directly af-
fected by the anti-immigrant sentiments that emerged, with many
in the majority questioning the patriotism of Latinas/os, particu-
larly the undocumented immigrants.79 Bender notes that this
questioning of patriotism was reflected in Congress' imposition
of a citizenship requirement on airport screeners which resulted
in many Latinas/os losing their jobs.8" However, the conse-
quences do not stop at non-citizen Latinas/os, because the racial
profiling that has been embraced by the government and the
country can then extend to citizens who are Latinas/os. 81 Bender
notes that racial profiling has been in use by the government to
target Latinas/os in immigrant enforcement and the war against
drugs. With the current climate, it can be extended in unpredict-
able ways.
Finally, Bender also looks at the possible assimilation pres-
sures that may result from the post-September 11 events, includ-
ing hostility against Spanish language speakers which would
simply build on the English-only movement that has been in play
for some time. Bender concludes by urging that the post-Sep-
tember 11 society not be one imbued with anti-immigrant senti-
ments, which have "forged a narrow Eurocentric vision of
nationhood based on commonalities of history and heritage that
viewed immigrants as disruptive anti-nation forces. ' '82 To the
77 Id. at 1155 (citations omitted).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1162.
81 See also Cole, supra note 5, at 959 (discussing how infringements on rights of
non-citizens can become the pathway to the infringement on rights of citizens); and
as the most recent decision in Hamdi makes evident. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2003).
82 Bender, supra note 74, at 1177.
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contrary, he adds his
voice to the faint chorus of those seeking to articulate a new
expansive vision of nationhood-one of cultural diversity....
Consistent with such a vision, Americans must forge a human-
ist unity marked by the respect of different cultures and their
contribution to America, a recognition of human rights, and
an acknowledgment of the invigorating effects of immigration.
This multicultural vision of nationhood would regard racial
profiling with great suspicion, would consider the human con-
sequences of militarizing and securing borders on immigrants
drawn to the United States by employment opportunities
rather than by evil intent, and would resist the pressures of
assimilation that purport to pronounce one culture and lan-
guage as superior and the rest as anti-American and
subversive. 83
These essays demonstrate how the national norms that have
historically existed and those that have been enacted specifically
in response to September 11 can constitute a misuse or abuse of
governmental power that can target "others" and deny them con-
stitutional rights. However, in seeking how to balance the need
to protect a population in a society with the protection of individ-
ual liberties, international norms may be of great assistance.
Thus, in the following section, this Essay will look at interna-
tional protections that may be useful in the analysis in this war
against terrorism.
III
POST-9/11 LEGAL ISSUES
In the wake of the September 11 tragedy, both the United
States and the international legal community were quick to act.
In this section, first the domestic response and then the interna-
tional concerns with respect to these events are presented. The
first part on domestic initiatives looks at three separate undertak-
ings: immigration detentions, the USA PATRIOT Act, and eth-
nic profiling. The section on the international issues analyzes the
definitions of war and terrorism, the applicability of the laws of
armed conflict to the "War on Terrorism," the U.S. designation
of the status of the terrorists in the context of international law,
and the legality of the military commissions created by President
Bush to try enemy combatants. To be sure, as Aldana-Pindell
noted in her work, the difficulty of creating demarcations be-
83 Id. at 1177-78.
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tween executive actions taken in the domestic interest as juxta-
posed to executive actions taken to protect national security,
given the nature of the September 11levents, makes it impossible
to create a clear divide between local and global acts.84 Indeed,
virtually every action and response can be said to have a "glocal"
character-partly global and partly local. Thus, this section's
separation into parts A and B-domestic and international con-
siderations, respectively-is a planned organizational artifice. A
perfect example of this is the U.S. executive order creating mili-
tary commissions with which this section deals in the interna-
tional section because of its close nexus to the international legal
status of the detainees.
A. Domestic Initiatives
One of the initial responses to the September 11 attacks was
the U.S. government's effort to detain non-citizens as a preven-
tive measure. Although the actual number of persons detained is
unknown, it is likely to be over 1000.85 Notwithstanding these
numbers, however, only one person-Zaccarias Moussaoui-has
been charged with any criminal offense. Significantly, he was ar-
rested before September 11.86 Moreover, the government has
only claimed that ten or eleven of the detainees might be mem-
bers of al Qaeda.87 Persons held in these secret detentions are
mostly charged with immigration offenses, although some are
held on federal criminal charges and a small number are being
held as material witnesses. The government has refused to pro-
vide the identity of or charges against the persons held in connec-
tion with the September 11 investigation.88
Until the Sixth Circuit ruled that secret proceedings are in vio-
lation of First Amendment rights of the public and the press to
observe trials, immigration detainees were tried in proceedings
that were closed to the public pursuant to the Creppy Direc-
tive.89 Some still are, however, as the circuits are now split with
the Third Circuit's October ruling that newspapers lack a First
84 Aldana-Pindell, supra note 55.
85 See Cole, supra note 5, at 960 (noting that in November 2001 the government
ceased informing the public about the number of detainees).
86 See, e.g., In Defence of U.S. Freedoms, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), June 3,
2002, at 16.
87 See Cole, supra note 5.
88 Id. at 961.
89 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
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Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings that the
Attorney General determines present significant national secur-
ity concerns. 90
Significantly, many of those detained have been held for ex-
tended periods of time without charges. Existing rules have been
amended to extend the time available to file charges and, in
times of emergency, for a "reasonable" period without being
charged. 9' One commentator notes "that 317 detainees were
held for more than 48 hours before being charged, 36 detainees
were held for more than four weeks without charges, and nine
were held for more than 50 days without charges. ' '9 2 This reality
reinforces the concerns expressed by Saito93 and Aldana-
Pindel 94 concerning the abrogation of personal liberties for the
sake of national security.
Congress enacted the second initiative, the USA PATRIOT
Act, only six weeks after the September 11 events. This law
grants broad powers to the Attorney General to detain individu-
als suspected of aiding terrorism. The Act has been criticized
because of its vague definition of terrorism, the absence of a
close nexus between the activities that can result in detention and
the commission of a crime, and the absence of judicial oversight
of detentions. 96 The PATRIOT Act also enlarges the informa-
tion gathering and sharing abilities of law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies. It allows "wiretaps and physical searches
without probable cause in criminal investigations so long as 'a
significant purpose' of the intrusion is to collect foreign
intelligence. ,,97
The PATRIOT Act also gives the Attorney General the ability
to detain non-citizens without a hearing and without a showing
that they pose a threat to national security; rather, the Attorney
General only needs to certify that he has "reasonable grounds to
believe" that the alien is "described" in any of a number of anti-
90 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
91 See Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 287).
92 Cole, supra note 5, at 962.
93 Saito, supra note 64.
94 Aldana-Pindell, supra note 55.
95 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 8.
96 For a review of significant PATRIOT Act provisions, as well as some of the
chief criticisms of the Act, see, e.g., Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Development:
USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 435 (2002).
97 Cole, supra note 5, at 974.
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terrorism provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 98
for such non-citizen to be subject to indefinite mandatory deten-
tion.9 9 It is not surprising that with these unprecedented powers,
Attorney General Ashcroft, in the same month as the USA PA-
TRIOT Act was passed, unilaterally announced that the Justice
Department would eavesdrop on conversations between defend-
ants and their lawyers in order to protect the country from the
terrorist threat.100
The third and last initiative considered here is one both
Bender 0 1 and Saito'0 2 addressed-ethnic profiling. In Novem-
ber following the attacks, the Justice Department announced that
it was singling out immigrant men over the age of sixteen and
from over twenty nations-mostly Arab or Muslim states-in or-
der to continue with the war against terrorism.'0 3 Given the re-
cent outcry against racial profiling, this practice has been
challenged as violating the equal protection clause, because it is
likely to be "a terribly inaccurate proxy" for terrorism, and be-
cause "the use of ethnic stereotypes, far from being 'necessary'
for effective law enforcement, is likely to be ineffective." 104
In closing, it is significant to note that domestic laws protect
basic rights being eroded by these initiatives. Rights at risk in-
clude political freedoms and liberties, due process, and equal
protection of the laws-rights that are not limited to citizens but
rather, according to the Constitution, apply to all "persons" sub-
ject to U.S. laws.10 5
B. International Concerns
That the war against terrorism implicates international norms
is immediately apparent by the name itself. The notion of war is
defined as "a condition of armed hostility between States ' 106 or
98 USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 8, § 412(a)(3).
99 Id.; see also Cole, supra note 5, at 971.
100 See Broder & Sachs, supra note 32.
101 Bender, supra note 74.
102 Saito, supra note 64.
103 See Broder & Sachs, supra note 32.
104 Cole, supra note 5, at 976.
105 See U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV & V.
106 David M. Ackerman, Response to Terrorism: Legal Aspects of the Use of Mili-
tary Force, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RS21009 (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21OO9.pdf (quoting CHARLES CHENEY
HYDE, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 1686 (1945)); see also DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND
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as a "state or condition of governments contending by force."',0 7
In this regard, an act of war "involves the threat or use of force of
some kind by one state against another."'01 8 Thus, whether a par-
ticular threat or use of force constitutes an act of war will depend
upon how the parties choose to characterize it. It is this subjec-
tivity that has given the United States the window to call these
attacks "acts of war" notwithstanding the absence of state par-
ties. This is significant because the United States itself has noted
that "war may be defined as a legal condition of armed hostility
between states."109 In this context, an "'act of war' means any
act occurring in the course of (a) a declared war; (b) armed con-
flict whether or not war has been declared between two or more
nations; or (c) armed conflict between military forces of any
origin[.]" t 0
In international law, jus ad bellum is the law that defines the
legitimate reasons for which a state may engage in war which
renders legal the use of force under international law." I In mod-
ern times, Articles 2 and 51 of the U.N. Charter set out the
norms of jus ad bellum. On the other hand, jus in bello encom-
passes norms that govern conduct once force has been used, re-
gardless of whether the recourse to force was lawful, and
regulates how wars are fought notwithstanding why or how they
started.'1 2 Both customary law' 13 and treaty law" 14 govern jus in
WARFARE: FM 27-10 8(a) (July 18, 1956), available at http://www.doctrine.usmc.
mil/mcrp/view/mcr5l2la/mcr5l2la.pdf.
107 Ackerman, supra note 106 (quoting Hyde, supra note 106, at 1686 n.1. (citing
Grotius, one of the original theorists of international law)).
108 Id.
109 DEP'T OF THE ARMY, supra note 106.
110 18 U.S.C. § 2331(4) (1994).
111 Mark A. Drumbl, Judging Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, Self-Defense and
Western Innocence, JURIST: THE LEGAL EDUCATION NETWORK § II, %1 5, at http://
www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorismdrumbl.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002); see Helen
Duffy, Responding to September I: The Framework of International Law, INTER-
IGHTS § 1, at 6 (Oct. 2001) at http://www.spc-consilio.com/Septll.pdf (last visited
Feb. 3, 2003); Karma Nabulsi, Jus ad Bellum-Jus in Bello, in CRIMES OF WAR:
THE BOOK, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/book.html (last visited
Jan. 10, 2003).
112 Duffy, supra note 111.
113 Steven Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International
Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707, 715 (1999) ("Customary law recognizes ... individual ac-
countability for certain acts . . : at least [as] insofar as it accepts the right of all states
to criminalize them and prosecute anyone committing them (universal jurisdic-
tion)."); Duffy, supra note 111, § 1, at 36-37.
114 See, e.g., the following four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional proto-
cols: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
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bello.
Interestingly, the term "war" is not used in the U.N. Charter,
although it had been used in the League of Nations Covenant
and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928."' Rather, the U.N.
Charter uses the term "force" rather than the term "war." '116 Sig-
nificantly, the language of Art. 2(4) is both specific-with respect
to the actors to whom it applies-and ambiguous with respect to
the meaning of force. 1 7 By its terms, the article applies only to
members of the United Nations, which can only be states.1 18 The
use of force also must be against a state.' 19 On the other hand,
the word "force" as used in the Charter could include not only
physical and military force, but also other types of coercion-
such as economic, political, or psychological force.120 Thus, the
U.N. Charter by Art. 2(4) obligates states to settle all disputes by
peaceful means and to refrain from use or threat of force in con-
ducting international relations. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
articulates one exception to the prohibition of the use of force:
self defense when an armed attack occurs. 12 ' There is one other
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August
12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention II]; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949 [hereinafter
Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Protocol II]. The four conventions are known
collectively as the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two protocols as the 1.977 Pro-
tocols to the Geneva Conventions.
115 Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1624 (1984).
116 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
117 "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id. By
its terms, this Article applies only to members which are states. See id.
118 Id.
119 See U.N. CHARTER art. 3 (addressing original members) and art. 4(1) (ad-
dressing states to whom membership in the United Nations is open).
120 Efforts made to give Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter this wider definition with
respect to the prohibition on the use of force has been strongly resisted by Western
states. See generally Schachter, supra note 115, at 1624.
121 U.N. CHARTER art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
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exception to the prohibition of the threat or use of force-armed
action that is authorized by the United Nations Security Council
as an enforcement measure. 122 A possible exception, currently
being debated, is the use of force for humanitarian interventions
in cases of large scale atrocities or acute deprivation of rights. 123
Before considering the rules of war that may apply to the war
against terrorism, it is important to examine the concept of ter-
rorism itself. There is no universally accepted definition of ter-
rorism, although common threads in the various definitions
include the use of violence for a political or social aim, a desire to
intimidate, and a targeting of civilian and other noncombatant
populations 12 4-elements that are reflected in both domestic and
international definitions of terrorism. In the United States, inter-
national terrorism is defined as:
[Aictivities that-(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States ... ; (B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimi-
date or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction,.. . , and (C)
occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of...
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum. 125
In the international realm, there is no precise, agreed-upon defi-
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security (emphasis added).
Significantly, Article 51 allows the exercise of "the inherent right of individual or
collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations." Id. It is noteworthy that while the self-defense right is triggered by an
armed attack on a member, the armed attack does not have to be carried out by a
member, thus opening the door for the self defense claim made by the United States
pursuant to the September 11 attacks.
122 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 39 & 42.
123 See Duffy, supra note 111, at 4-5.
124 See Rich Mkhondo, Terrorism, CRIMES OF WAR: THE BOOK, available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/book.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) ("Terror-
ism is more than simple violence which requires only two parties, an aggressor and a
victim. Terrorism needs a third party, who might be intimidated by what happened
to the victim.").
125 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (1994).
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nition of terrorism, although there are at least nineteen conven-
tions-treaties both on international humanitarian law and
establishing international crimes, both international'26 and re-
gional127 in scope-and declarations 128 that address the concept
of and prohibit terrorism. For example, the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention of 1949 and its two additional protocols of 1977 banned
terrorism during international and internal armed conflict, mean-
ing they ban attacks directed against civilians.129 Significantly,
although commonly terrorism is understood to address acts by
groups that are not part of a state, terrorist acts can include those
that are carried out by or sponsored by a state either directly or
indirectly, or implicitly sanctioned by a state. 130 However, one of
the difficulties experienced in defining terrorism "reflects in part
the hackneyed saying that one person's terrorist is another's free-
dom fighter.... 131
If indeed this current "war against terrorism" is a war, then it
raises the issue of whether the laws of armed conflict are, or can
be, applicable to such a conflict. As one commentator has noted,
this designation poses a challenge to the traditional application
of armed conflict as the actions of September 11 represent:
126 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS RE-
LATED TO THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM pt. 1
(2001), [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS] (listing twelve instruments re-
lated to suppression of terrorism); Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (Sept. 17, 1998); Convention for the Prevention
and Punishment of Terrorism; Resolution 40 of 1985; International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164
(Dec. 15, 1997); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, G.A. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999).
127 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 126, pt. II (listing seven
instruments related to suppression of terrorism).
128 See id. pt. III.
129 See Convention IV, supra note 114; Protocol I, supra note 114; Protocol II,
supra note 114.
130 See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 126, at 230 (Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60 (Dec. 9, 1944)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 49/60] ("Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of
acts of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including those in
which States are directly or indirectly involved, which endanger or take innocent
lives, have a deleterious effect on international relations and may jeopardize the
security of states")); id. at 237 (Declaration to Supplement the 1964 Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210 (Dec. 17, 1966)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 51/210](same)).
131 Duffy, supra note 111, at 33 (citing Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and
Human Rights report of June 27, 2001); see also Mkhondo, supra note 124 ("One
obvious difficulty with using the term within IHL is that, as has often been pointed
out, one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.").
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[S]omething of a hybrid between war and crime. The scale
and scope of the assault of September 11 were clearly on the
level of an act of war, but in traditional legal thinking, armed
conflict has generally been seen as taking place only between
states or (in the case of civil wars) between groups in control
of part of a country's territory. Terrorists, by contrast, have
tended to be seen as criminals, to be pursued through law-
enforcement means and subjected to trial if captured.132
This reality raises the question of whether the September 11 at-
tacks could be an act of war since al Qaeda, who is responsible
for the attack, is not a state actor and bin Laden is not, and has
never been, the leader of a member state or an insurgent 133 or
belligerent,'34 although it may be questionable whether the
Taliban had such status. Thus, some maintain that "any conflict
between the United States and al Qaeda as such cannot amount
to war or trigger application of the laws of war.'1 35 If the Sep-
tember 11 attacks could not attain the level of armed conflict,
132 Anthony Dworkin, Law and the Campaign Against Terrorism: The View from
the Pentagon, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT: ON THE NEWS, Dec., 2002, available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-pentagon.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
133 Insurgency is the lowest level of warfare or armed conflict to which the laws of
war apply. For it to exist, the insurgent group would have to resemble a govern-
ment, an organized military force, have control of significant portions of territory
that they hold as their own, and a stable population or base of support within a
broader population. See generally Jordan J. Paust, There Is No Need to Revise the
Laws of War in Light of September l1th, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT'L LAW
TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, Nov. 2002, at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/paust.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003); see Convention I, supra note 114, art. 3. Protocol II of the
Geneva Conventions provides for applying the law of war to conflicts between the
states' "armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which come under responsible command, exercise such control over part of its terri-
tory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and
to implement this protocol." Protocol II, supra note 114.
134 Belligerent status is based upon the same criteria for insurgency plus the
outside recognition by one or more states as a belligerent or as a state. JORDAN J.
PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 809, 812-13, 815-16, 819, 831-32 (2d
ed. 2002). Belligerent status provides a rebel group legal standing similar to that
accorded a government in bringing.the law of international armed conflict in to play
for both sides. Ewen Allison & Robert K. Goldman, Belligerent Status, CRIMES OF
WAR: THE BOOK, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/book.html (last
visited Jan. 2, 2003) ("A rebel group gained 'belligerent status' when all of the fol-
lowing had occurred: it controlled territory in the State against which it was rebel-
ling; it declared independence, if its goal was secession; it had well-organized armed
forces; it began hostilities against the government; and, importantly, the government
recognized it as a belligerent").
135 Paust, supra note 133, at 2; see also Pan American Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1013-15 (2d Cir. 1974) (United States could not have been
at war with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine which had engaged in
terrorists acts as a nonstate, nonbelligerent, noninsurgent actor).
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then combatant status which is exclusive to members of the
armed forces of a party to a conflict could not have attached to al
Qaeda.136
While there can be debate as to whether the September 11 at-
tacks constituted armed conflict, there can be no doubt that the
October 7 use of military force against the Taliban in Afghani-
stan internationalized the up-until-then internal armed conflict
between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. The laws of war
would apply to the conflict between the Taliban and the North-
ern Alliance as well as to the internationalized conflict between
the United States and the Taliban once military force against the
Taliban in Afghanistan was used by the United States on and af-
ter October 7, 2001.137 Because laws of war apply, such norms
govern the designation of the persons captured during, and de-
tained pursuant to, that conflict.
Before analyzing the U.S. detention of al Qaeda and Taliban
members, ascertaining what law applies to the detainees, and de-
termining the validity of the established military commissions, it
is important to note the danger of the elision of the concepts of
crime and war effected by the U.S. insistence that laws of armed
conflict apply to the war on terrorism.138 An approach that blurs
crime and war can render criminals subjects of international law
entitled to protection by principles of jus in bello and grant cap-
tured terrorists prisoner of war status which may then legitimize
136 A.P.V. Rogers, Combatant Status, CRIMES OF WAR: THE BOOK, available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/book.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
During an armed conflict, only 'combatants' are permitted to 'take a direct
part in hostilities.' Noncombatants who do so commit a war crime and lose
any protected status that they might have-that is, they are not entitled to
be treated as prisoners of war, and any attacks on people or property may
be prosecuted as common crime. Combatants ... cannot be punished for
their hostile acts and if captured can only be held as POWs until the end of
hostilities.
Id.
137 See Paust, supra note 133, at 3.
138 Anthony Dworkin, Excerpts from Interview with Charles Allen, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel for International Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, CRIMES OF WAR
PROJECT: ON THE NEWS, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/on
news/news-pentagon-trans.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
With regard to the global war on terrorism, wherever it may reach, the law
of armed conflict certainly does apply, not only in the sense that we've
been focusing on (concerning the treatment of detainees), but also in the
sense of the principle of distinction, in the sense of targeting decisions, and
in the sense of how those who are removed from the combat are treated.
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their acts as wartime hostilities which are not prohibited by jus
ad bellum. As a British military historian stated, "To declare war
on terrorists .. is at once to accord them a status and a dignity
that they seek and do not deserve." '139 Indeed, if the terrorists
were instead combatants, they would be immune from prosecu-
tion for attacks on military targets such as the Pentagon-an act
that the United States would be loathe to view as a legitimate act
of war rather than as a criminal terrorist act. 4 '
139 Dworkin, supra note 132 (quoting British military historian Sir Michael How-
ard's 2001 speech).
140 See generally id.; Georges Abi-Saab, There Is No Need to Reinvent the Law,
CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/sept-mag/sept-
abi-printer.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2003); Paust, supra note 133, at 3-4 (Noting that
[w]ith respect to the September 11th attacks as such, any attempt to expand
the concept of war beyond the present minimal levels of belligerency and
insurgency would be extremely dangerous because certain forms of non-
state actor violence and targetings that otherwise remain criminal could
become legitimate. Two such targetings would have been the September
11th attack on the Pentagon, a legitimate military target during armed con-
flict or war (except for the means used, an airliner with passengers and
crew), and the previous attack on the U.S.S. Cole, another legitimate mili-
tary target during armed conflict or war. Similarly, a radical extension of
the status of war and the laws of war to terroristic attacks by groups like al
Qaeda (and there are or predictably will be many such groups engaged in
social violence) would legitimize al Qaeda attacks on the President (as
Commander-in-Chief) and various U.S. "military personnel and facilities"
in the U.S. and abroad-attacks of special concern to President Bush, as
noted in his November 13th Military Order. Applying the status of war
and the laws of war to armed violence below the level of an insurgency can
have the unwanted consequence of legitimizing various other combatant
acts and immunizing them from prosecution.)
Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 683-85 (2002) (noting that
[t]he United States cannot be at 'war' with al Qaeda . . . [because the]
threshold of 'armed conflict' under common article 2 of the Geneva Con-
ventions, which triggers application of the detaining power's competence
under article 5 of the Geneva Civilian Convention to intern certain per-
sons, cannot be met if the United States is merely fighting members of al
Qaeda. Other problems with those seeking prosecution include the fact
that (1) mere membership in an organization (like al Qaeda) is not a crime;
(2) acts of warfare engaged in by members of the armed forces of a party to
an international armed conflict (begun on October 7, 2001, in Afghanistan)
are entitled to immunity from prosecution if their acts are not otherwise
violative of international law and, thus, lawful combat training and actions
of members of the armed forces of the Taliban (and perhaps members of al
Qaeda units attached to the armed forces of the Taliban) during the armed
conflict are privileged belligerent acts entitled to combat immunity and
cannot properly be criminal, elements of domestic crime, or acts of an al-
leged conspiracy; and (3) al Qaeda attacks on the United States on Septem-
ber 11th (before the international armed conflict in Afghanistan began)
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In light of international legal principles which confer signifi-
cant immunities on combatants for taking part in hostilities, and
which deny protected status for noncombatants who partake in
hostilities that render them war criminals, it is important to clas-
sify the status of the captives. 14' During an international armed
conflict, a party to the conflict may detain persons without trial if
they are "suspected [of] or engaged in activities hostile to the
security of the state. ' 142 Such detention without trial can last for
the duration of the hostilities. 143  During detention, "persons
shall ... be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not
be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by
[applicable norms]. 144 Detainees must be released upon the end
of hostilities but always "at the earliest date consistent with the
security of the state or occupying power.... ,145 Based on cus-
tomary human rights law, every detainee has a right to obtain
judicial review about the circumstances and conditions of their
detention.
Charles Allen, Deputy General Counsel for International Af-
fairs at the United States Department of Defense, confirmed that
"fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict have proven
themselves to be applicable to this conflict.' 1 46 He noted that:
The authority to detain enemy combatants during hostilities is
well settled under international law and certainly under the
U.S. Constitution, and . . . we don't foresee the end of the
conflict at a particular date. But it is absolutely lawful to de-
tain these enemy combatants until the end of the hostilities;
therefore, it is by no means an indefinite detention in the
sense that one might attribute to the lawless countries that
cannot be privileged belligerent acts, but also cannot be prosecuted as war
crimes because the United States and al Qaeda cannot be "at war" under
international law.) (citations omitted).
141 See Paust, supra note 133, at 6.
Enemy combatants are privileged to engage in lawful acts of war such as
the targeting of military personnel and other legitimate military targets.
Such acts are privileged belligerent acts or acts entitled to combat immu-
nity if they are not otherwise violative of the laws of war or other interna-
tional laws (e.g., those proscribing aircraft sabotage, aircraft hijacking,
genocide or other crimes against humanity). Violations of the laws of war
are war crimes, are not entitled to immunity, and are thus prosecutable.
Id.
142 Convention IV, supra note 114, art. 5.
143 Id. art. 6.
144 Id. art. 5.
145 Id.
146 Dworkin, supra note 138.
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have no process attaching to the detention of persons in their
control. 17
Having designated the detainees as enemy combatants,148 Al-
len defines the enemy as "al-Qaeda and ... other international
terrorists and their supporters." '49 He then invokes the right to
self defense:
The world agrees that the U.S. was attacked and is in armed
conflict with that stated enemy. Therefore, in exercising our
right of self-defence [sic], we can target members of that en-
emy force and we certainly can detain such persons in accor-
dance with the laws of armed conflict.150
Moreover, he specified that:
The regime of law that applies is the customary law of armed
conflict. The determination has been made that al Qaeda is by
no means a state party to the Geneva Conventions. It's a for-
eign terrorist group, and clearly its members are not entitled
to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions.
With regard to the Taliban, even though the United States did
not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan govern-
ment, Afghanistan is a party to the Geneva Conventions and
was determined by the President to be covered by the Con-
ventions. But under the terms of the Conventions the Taliban
do not qualify as prisoners of war. Having said that, we apply
existing law of armed conflict and treat the detainees-al
Qaeda and Taliban alike-humanely and in a manner consis-
tent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions, which we
believe are part of the international law of armed conflict.1 51
The distinction between a prisoner of war and an unlawful
combatant is being intensely debated precisely because the out-
come signifies whether an individual would be entitled to the
protections of the Geneva Conventions-a prisoner of war is en-
147 Id.
148 Id. Enemy combatant is defined as:
an individual who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for
the duration of an armed conflict. In the current conflict with al Qaida and
the Taliban, for example, the term includes a member, agent, or associate
of al Qaida or the Taliban .... The authority to detain enemy combatants
applies not just to armed soldiers engaged in battlefield combat, but ex-
tends to all belligerents, including any individuals who act in concert with
enemy forces and aim to further their cause. An individual cannot immu-
nize himself from treatment as an enemy combatant by attempting to ex-
tend the battle beyond the traditional battlefield.
Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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titled to protections, while an unlawful combatant-one who was
not following the rules of war-does not. Some insist that al
Qaeda fighters do not qualify as prisoners of war under any cir-
cumstances because they do not meet the standard set forth by
the Geneva Conventions for prisoner of war status for irregular
militias. 5 ' On the other hand, while conceding that the question
of whether Taliban members qualify for prisoner of war status "is
more difficult," some similarly conclude that the Taliban do not
qualify because of their failure to wear a distinctive sign and to
"carry arms openly." '153
The U.S. designation of detained individuals as "enemy com-
batants" and the claim that they may be detained indefinitely
without right of judicial review with respect to their detention
raises legal issues. The designation is not a term of art known in
international law. Rather, it appeared in a U.S. Supreme Court
decision of 1942, Ex parte Quirin,' 4 a case in which German
soldiers came into the country, hid their uniforms, and planned
sabotage before being apprehended. They were arrested and
tried for crimes of war in the U.S. courts and were convicted and
sentenced.' 55 The Court, which did not depart from the interna-
tional legal principles set out earlier in this Essay, specifically
stated:
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful popula-
tions of belligerent nations and also between those who are
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are sub-
ject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing
military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render
their belligerency unlawful.56
Thus, with respect to the detainees, the United States has uni-
152 Michael C. Dorf, What Is an "Unlawful Combatant" and Why It Matters: The
Status of Detained Al Qaeda and Taliban Fighters, FINDLAw, LEGAL COMMENTARY,
Jan. 23, 2002, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020123.html (citing Art. IV of
the Geneva Conventions (noting that the criteria are "(a) that of being commanded
by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; [and] (d) that of
conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war" and
that "[al] Qaeda does not satisfy these conditions.").
153 Id.
154 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942).
155 See id.
156 Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted).
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laterally decreed that they are not being held as prisoners of war
but instead as so-called unlawful combatants. The reasons for
concluding that they are not POWs differ, but what is indisputa-
ble is that, having made these unilateral designations, the United
States has failed to hold hearings to determine the legal status of
the detainees as required by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Con-
ventionm57-a decision harshly criticized by the international
community. It is precisely because it is not always clear what
status designation a person captured during armed conflict de-
serves, and because there are different levels of protections for
prisoners of war and for those captured who do not qualify for
such status, that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention spe-
cifically provides that:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having commit-
ted a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article
4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Con-
vention until such time as their status has been determined by
a competent tribunal.' 58
Thus, it appears that the U.S. unilateral declaration of status of
the prisoners is inappropriate based on existing law.
In addition, because the detainees are being held in GuantA-
namo Bay, Cuba, which at least one court has now determined is
outside U.S. sovereign territory, they are beyond the reach of the
U.S. Constitution.'59 This decision has been criticized as a "pecu-
liar reading of the [habeas corpus] statute."' 60 One commentator
argues that:
The district court seemed to strain against the ordinary mean-
ing of the word "jurisdiction" and added a word that Congress
had not chosen, i.e., the word "territorial," as a limitation of
"jurisdiction" or power. . . . The statutory language simply
cannot support such a perverse reading. Indeed, the statute
focuses on "jurisdiction" of courts, not territory or sovereignty
of the United States, and the district court seemed to confuse
the meaning of the statute with issues concerning the reach of
the Constitution. As noted, the statute expressly reaches vio-
lations of laws other than the Constitution.... What the court
failed to address is that sovereignty is a form of lawful govern-
157 Convention III, supra note 114, art. 5.
158 Id.
159 Coalition of Clergy et al. v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.
Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002).
160 Paust, supra note 140, at 691-92.
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mental power and that wherever the United States detains in-
dividuals, it is exercising a form of sovereign power.
Additionally, Guantanamo Bay is under the sovereign power
and a form of territorial jurisdiction of the United States:
under a treaty with Cuba that confers "complete jurisdiction
and control over and within such areas"-and, thus, sover-
eignty-as an occupying power.... In any event, the statute's
word "jurisdiction" is met by the treaty (i.e., the United States
has "complete jurisdiction and control" and is fully exercising
it) as well as by the status of the United States as occupying
power with jurisdiction and control. 161
Having addressed the status of the detainees, the legality of
their indefinite detention, and the applicability of the laws of war
to the detainees, this section now reviews President Bush's No-
vember 13, 2001, military order creating military commissions to
try foreign nationals "for violations of the laws of war and other
applicable laws" that were related to acts of international terror-
ism.162 The Order covers acts that have "adverse effects on the
United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or
economy,' 1 63 has no time limit, 164 and originally contemplated
that under the "order the principles of law and the rules of evi-
dence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts" would not apply.165
As with other actions taken pursuant to the September 11 at-
tacks, the legality of the military commissions is hotly debated.
One commentator has noted that the "[o]rder reaches far beyond
the congressional authorization given the President" in the wake
of September 11 to prevent future acts of international terrorism
against the United States,166 and that "[i]n its present form and
without appropriate congressional intervention, the Military Or-
der will create military commissions that involve unavoidable vi-
olations of international law and raise serious constitutional
challenges. "167 One issue with respect to the military commis-
sions is that the President's power as commander-in-chief to set
up such commissions is only applicable during "war within a war
161 Id. at 691-92 (citations omitted).
162 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 1(e).
163 Id. § 2(a)(1)(ii).
164 See generally id.
165 Id. § 1(f).
166 Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001).
167 Id. at 2.
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zone or relevant occupied territory and apparently ends when
peace is finalized."16 Thus, while there is a war in Afghanistan,
the United States would be able to set up military commissions to
try persons accused of war crimes and, if it were an occupying
power in Afghanistan, it could set up
a military commission in the occupied territory to try individu-
als for terrorism in violation of international law, genocide,
other crimes against humanity, and aircraft sabotage in addi-
tion to war crimes. However, outside of the occupied terri-
tory, . . . military commissions can only be constituted in an
actual war zone and can only prosecute war crimes.' 69
Moreover,.military commissions need to follow procedures as re-
quired by treaty and customary norms which guarantee due pro-
cess of law, including the right of "all persons" to be treated as
"equal before the courts and tribunals ... entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribu-
nal established by law,"17 "the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law,"17' the right "[t]o be in-
formed promptly and in detail in a language which he under-
stands of the nature and cause of the charge against him," 172 the
right "[t]o have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own
choosing,"'173 the right "[t]o be tried without undue delay, 1 74 the
right
To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if
he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have
legal assistance assigned to him, in any such case where the
interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in
such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it, 175
the right "[t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
168 Id. at 5.
169 Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
170 Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 14(1), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPRJ. Significantly, "[t]he press and the public may be
excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public)
or national security." Id.
171 Id. art. 14(2).
172 Id. art. 14(3)(a).
173 Id. art. 14(3)(b).
174 Id. art. 14(3)(c).
175 Id. art. 14(3)(d).
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against him,",176 the right "[t]o have free assistance of an inter-
preter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in
court,"' 177 and the right "[n]ot to be compelled to testify
against himself or confess guilt.'
1 78
In addition, "[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the
right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher
tribunal according to law.' 79 Plainly, the November 13 Military
Order which provides only for review by the President or Secre-
tary of State does not comport with this right of review. Moreo-
ver, given that the Military Order is addressed only to foreign
nationals, it also violates the nondiscrimination provisions of in-
ternational norms.180
Two other challenges to the Military Order interrogate the
President's authority, without approval by Congress, to suspend
habeas corpus 18 1 and to "set up a military commission outside of
occupied territory or an actual war zone during an armed con-
flict." '182 Moreover, these infirmities with the Military Order are
continued by the Department of Defense Ad Hoc Procedures
implemented by order of March 21, 2002.183 For example, the
Department of Defense rules continue the discrimination on the
basis of national or social origin, deny equal protection, and deny
justice to foreigners. 184 However, it is the position of the United
176 Id. art. 14(3)(e).
177 Id. art. 14(3)(f).
178 Id. art. 14(3)(g).
179 Id. art. 14(5).
180 See, e.g., id. art. 2 which requires that:
Each State Party ... undertake[ ] to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, or other status.
See also id. art. 26 providing that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimi-
nation to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effec-
tive protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, or other status.
181 Paust, supra note 166, at 21.
182 Id. at 26.
183 Paust, supra note 140, at 677.
184 Id. at 678.
Under the DOD Order, civilians may not be tried in civilian courts, the
accused have been detained for months without charges, detainees do not
enjoy the right to be brought promptly before a judge or to file habeas
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States that:
The law of armed conflict makes no provision for judicial re-
view of the detention of enemy combatants who are detained
during hostilities solely to take them out of the fight. There is
a recognition in the law of armed conflict that during hostili-
ties, the military through its operations and intelligence-gath-
ering has an unparalleled vantage point to learn about the
enemy and make judgments as to whether those seized during
a conflict are friend or foe.' 18 5
Moreover, a U.S. representative specifically notes the Supreme
Court's finding in Ex parte Quirin to support trying the captive in
a military tribunal.'86
To be sure, there is constitutional authority for the creation of
military commissions.'' Indeed, Congress provided for military
commissions in Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice. 188 Rather, the issue with respect to President Bush's mili-
corpus petitions, defense attorneys will lack access to some witnesses, ac-
cused will not be able to cross-examine all witnesses against them, portions
of trials can be held in secret, and accused lack the right of appeal to an
independent and impartial tribunal.
Id. It should be noted, however, that during international armed conflicts there may
be indefinite detentions without trial, which can last for the duration of the conflict.
See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text. Indeed, Article 118 of the Third
Geneva Convention of 1949 specifically states that prisoners "shall be released and
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." Convention III,
supra note 114, art. 118. This obligation is reiterated in the 1977 First Additional
Protocol which notes that "[u]njustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of
war or civilians" constitutes a grave breach over which there is universal jurisdiction.
Protocol I, supra note 114, art. 85(4)(b). Nonetheless, a belligerent is allowed to
ensure that the enemy has ceased fighting and does not intend to resume the conflict
before releasing the captives. Charles Allen, Deputy General Counsel for Interna-
tional Affairs of the U.S. Department of Defense, confirms the claim to authority to
detain enemy combatants during hostilities although he does not "foresee the end of
the conflict at a particular date." Dworkin, supra note 138. In fact, Allen notes that
releasing the captives before the end of the hostilities "would probably result in that
person rejoining the battle against the United States. That's the underlying basis for
being able to detain enemy combatants during armed conflict." Id.
185 Dworkin, supra note 138.
186 Id. at 9 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31).
187 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 ("By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15,
Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in
appropriate cases."). See American Bar Ass'n Task Force on Terrorism and the Law
Report and Recommendations on Military Commissions, Jan. 4, 2002, at http://www.
aba.net.org/poladv/letters/exec/militarycolm-report.pdf at p. 2 (last visited Dec. 17,
2002) [hereinafter ABA Task Force].
188 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994) ("The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction
upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that
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tary order is whether he, under the sole power as commander-in-
chief, had the authority to establish such commission or whether
the September 18, 2001, Congressional Joint Resolution' 89 au-
thorized the creation of such commission. While some argue that
the "all necessary and appropriate force" language authorizes the
President's military order,190 others argue that the military order
is beyond the purview of the Joint Resolution. 191 In all cases,
there seems to be agreement that the lack of judicial review is
problematic. 192
CONCLUSION
The heinous attacks of September 11 have resulted, perhaps
unnecessarily, in the adoption of a flurry of problematic domestic
norms that target persons based on race or ethnicity, treat na-
tionals and non-nationals differently, and unduly intrude into
constitutionally protected rights. As this Essay has shown, the
domestic legislation also potentially conflicts with established in-
ternational norms.
Significantly, it appears that these legislative and executive ac-
tivities are not only intrusive but perhaps also unnecessary be-
cause existing United States and international norms already
address the heinous conduct. First, considering that al Qaeda
and the Taliban are non-state actors, they could be held for viola-
tions such as piracy, war crimes, violations against the law of na-
tions, violations of human rights, and other acts of hostility.193
For example, those acting outside of the United States in connec-
tion with the September 11 attacks could be prosecuted by the
by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts,
or other military tribunals").
189 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224. The president is authorized:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.
Id.
190 ABA Task Force, supra note 187, at 6.
191 Paust, supra note 166.
192 See id. at 12-16, 21-22, 27-28; ABA Task Force, supra note 187, at 10-11.
193 See John Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002). See gener-
ally Jordan J. Paust, Sanctions Against Non-State Actors for Violations of Interna-
tional Law, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 417 (2002).
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United States under the U.S. Antiterrorism Act.' 94 Similarly,
civil lawsuits are possible against non-state actors under the An-
titerrorism Act which allows remedies to be brought by "na-
tional[s] of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terror-
ism . . and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sus-
tains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees."'1 95
Foreign plaintiffs could sue non-state actors under the Alien Tort
Claims Act' 96 which allows a non-national to sue in the courts of
the United States for a tort committed in violation of the law of
nations. It is also possible that U.S. plaintiffs and foreign plain-
tiffs may have recourse under the Torture Victim Protection
Act. 197 Because international terrorism and crimes against hu-
manity are international wrongs over which there exists universal
jurisdiction,' 98 the United States could rightfully prosecute per-
petrators for such crimes.
Beyond existing domestic legislation, ample international ba-
ses for prosecutions also exist. For example, the United States
could prosecute both state and non-state actors under legislation
implementing the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.1 99 The ena-
bling law is applicable to anyone who "willfully ... destroys, dis-
ables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of
the United States ... [and to whomever] performs an act of vio-
lence against or incapacitates any individual on any such aircraft.
... 2 There are also other conventions and declarations pursu-
ant to which the wrongdoers could be held accountable for their
terrorist acts including the International Convention Against the
194 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq. (1994). See generally Paust, supra note 193, at 417-19.
195 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1994).
196 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
197 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987) ("A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment
for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern
such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes,
and perhaps certain acts of terrorism . .
199 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, opened for signature Sept. 21, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into force
Jan. 26, 1973).
200 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1)-(5) (1994).
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Taking of Hostages, 201 the Geneva Conventions fully discussed in
the Essay, the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Interna-
tional Terrorism,20 2 and the Declaration to Supplement the 1994
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terror-
ism.2° 3 Finally, the laws of war as they currently exist are amply
sufficient to prosecute the wrongdoers for the crimes committed
against the United States and its populations.0 4 Thus, given the
broad and detailed protections under existing domestic and inter-
national law, there is no need for the United States to trample on
the rights of citizens and non-citizens, immigrants, or detainees in
pursuit of justice against these heinous attacks.
201 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S 205 (entered into force June 3, 1983).
202 See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 126, at 230 (G.A. Res. 49/60).
203 Id. at 237 (G.A. Res. 51/210).
204 See generally Paust, supra note 133.
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